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Abstract
Track switches are safety critical assets that not only provide flexibility to rail networks but also present single points of
failure. Switch failures within dense-traffic passenger rail systems cause a disproportionate level of delay. Subsystem
redundancy is one of a number of approaches, which can be used to ensure an appropriate safety integrity and/or
operational reliability level, successfully adopted by, for example, the aeronautical and nuclear industries. This paper
models the adoption of a functional redundancy approach to the functional subsystems of traditional railway track
switching arrangements in order to evaluate the potential increase in the reliability and availability of switches. The
paper makes three main contributions. First, 2P-Weibull failure distributions for each functional subsystem of each
common category of points operating equipment are established using a timeline and iterative maximum likelihood
estimation approach, based on almost 40,000 sampled failure events over 74,800 years of continuous operation. Second,
these results are used as baselines in a reliability block diagram approach to model engineering fault tolerance, through
subsystem redundancy, into existing switching systems. Third, the reliability block diagrams are used with a Monte-Carlo
simulation approach in order to model the availability of redundantly engineered track switches over expected asset
lifetimes. Results show a significant improvement in the reliability and availability of switches; unscheduled downtime
reduces by an order of magnitude across all powered switch types, whilst significant increases in the whole-system
reliability are demonstrated. Hence, switch designs utilising a functional redundancy approach are well worth further
investigation. However, it is also established that as equipment failures are engineered out, switch reliability/availability
can be seen to plateau as the dominant contributor to unreliability becomes human error.
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Introduction
This paper demonstrates the possible reliability bene-
fits from the adoption of functionally redundant sub-
systems in railway track switching, using baseline
data from a modern, high-performance rail network.
A background in the existing track switch design and
practice is first established. The reliability perform-
ance of existing installations is examined by using a
dataset provided by the UK infrastructure owner,
Network Rail. These data are analysed to provide
failure distributions of switch installations, and indi-
vidual subsystems thereof, in the section titled
‘Establishing Failure Rates and Distributions’. An
RBD (reliability block diagram) modelling approach
is used to establish the analytical reliability (static)
and availability (dynamic) benefit of applying a
multi-channel architecture to track switch designs,
to provide a degree of redundancy. The results are
presented and examined in the ‘Analysis’ section
and show that the approach can deliver track switch-
ing with operational reliability much enhanced when
compared to existing installations.
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Background
Rail networks requiring more than a single
vehicle upon a single line are dependent upon the abil-
ity to provide multiple routes for traffic. Switches
(UK: Points) serve this purpose, allowing the
track to merge and diverge. The standard switch
design, in use throughout the world, consists of two
‘switch blades’ upon a suitable supporting structure,
which are able to slide laterally between two ‘stock
rails’. Whilst recognising that switch actuation has
evolved over time – from mechanical rods and levers
to more modern electro-mechanical or electro-
hydraulic designs – the basic mechanical arrangement
of switches has remained identical since the first rail-
ways were envisioned. An extensive description of
switch design is provided by Morgan.1
Despite their necessity, switch failures can rapidly
cripple rail operations. Unlike road transportation,
where vehicles can simply steer around failed vehicles
or roadway, in a guided transport system the vehicles
are reliant upon switches in order to change direction.
This means that a switch failure renders all vehicles
upon direct approach unable to move until it is
repaired. This disruption is magnified where no wider
diversionary route is available, and the consequent
‘knock-on delays’ increase rapidly. Ison et al.2 list
some UK routes now running at over 90% capacity,
and similar situations exist upon major commuter rail-
ways in continental Europe. In such situations, the
effects of switch failures are profound. Literature
explores optimisation options for managing perturbed
traffic to reduce these knock-on delays, for instance the
work of Pellegrini et al.3 Eliminating the cause of
delays and perturbations by preventing switch failures
is another approach explored in literature, for instance
by Garcı´a et al.,4 and Silmon and Roberts5 – both
papers exploring condition monitoring algorithms
and architectures with the goal of reducing failures.
Garcı´a et al.6 also explore a move to reliability-centred
maintenance, rather than the periodic maintenance
regime currently in place. However, these approaches
do not render the system truly ‘fault tolerant’ and are
instead aimed at reducing the incidence of failure
through predicting when failures are likely to occur.
In addition, with a single-point-of-failure system and
limited time/budget to cope with false positives, these
strategies may have a diminishing return when looking
to enhance system availability, a problem which is dis-
cussed by Bemment et al.7
Fault tolerance
A fault tolerant system is able to prevent faults
developing into failures through design, as described
by Blanke and Schro¨der.8 This design can include:
. Systems which isolate or compensate for faulty
components
. Functional design providing a level of capability
without given components
. Parallel channels which can each perform a given
set of requirements alone
In most cases, the first two options cost less in
monetary terms, but some safety critical systems are
forced to follow the third principle, despite cost/
weight penalties, to achieve the level of reliability/
integrity deemed necessary for the safe operation
of the system. Fault tolerance is important in safety-
critical engineering, such as in aircraft, bridges,
cars and nuclear power. Without fault tolerance,
many designs could not function to the standard
required by their regulatory environment. A prime
example is aircraft flight control surfaces, which
would typically have triplex or quadruplex sensor, con-
trol and actuation systems to ensure control of the air-
craft in the case of concurrent failure of several
actuation systems. Literature explores options
for fault tolerance at rail junctions, for instance
by Ursani et al.9 However, this approach is related to
tolerance of faults in the optimum scheduling of traffic
by reconfiguring the signalling, and not the tolerance of
asset failures.
Other applications involving safety-critical systems
have utilised redundancy as a method of achieving
high-availability and/or fault-tolerant operation,
as described in Hecht10 and Isermann.11 Redundant
systems have seen use in the rail sphere, a success-
ful and internationally adopted example being the
architecture of solid state interlocking.12 This has pro-
vision for both fault detection and tolerance; triplex
individual processing units vote and any singular dis-
agreement in output is discarded, with the whole
system continuing to function at a degraded level.
This approach has not yet, however, been adopted
for physical elements of the track switching system.
Current practice
Physical arrangement
Figure 1 shows the diagram of a typical UK installa-
tion, consisting of two stock rails, two switch rails and
a common crossing, fastened by clips, bolts and/or
chairs to supporting bearers of wood or concrete,
themselves supported upon a bed of ballast or con-
crete slab. The stock rails are securely fixed to prevent
movement, whilst the ends of the switch rails are free
to slide upon supporting cast iron chairs, their move-
ment restricted by the attached stretcher bars and the
lock and drive arrangement provided by the POE
(points operating equipment).
There are several different designs of POE (see
‘Subsystem Identification’ section) which are located
variously in between the running rails, at the line side
or a combination of both. Detection rods and/or
switches provide feedback that the blades have
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reached an acceptable position (and are locked) to the
POE, and subsequently the interlocking system.
Higher line speeds necessitate shallower divergence
angles due to limitations on lateral acceleration and
cant deficiency at the common crossing. This in turn
requires longer switches. Longer designs require mul-
tiple actuation points upon the switch blades to ensure
the entire moveable blade length (up to around 40m in
some designs) is positioned correctly for the passage of
traffic. This actuation is provided either by a power
take-off from the main actuator or additional actuators
situated along the length of the movable portion –
though crucially, not in a redundant configuration
because all actuators must be operating correctly.
The principles of power point operation were
established in the early 20th century as the power
point machines and electric signalling became wide-
spread. The operating principles are extensively
described by Hadaway.14 The principles have more
recently been combined into an industry standard,
in GKRT0062.15 For the UK case, the turnout is com-
manded to be in either of two positions – labelled
‘normal’ or ‘reverse’ – at all times by the interlocking.
If the required position changes, the command signal
from the interlocking will change over, triggering a
sequence of events in the line-side control circuitry
and POE which is referred to as the ‘move-lock-
detect’ cycle, which occurs as follows:
1. Detection of the current position is broken, allow-
ing the actuator to move.
2. The actuator begins movement, first unlocking the
switch blades, allowing them to move freely.
3. The actuator moves both switch blades simultan-
eously to their commanded position.
4. The blades reach their commanded position, and
the actuator ceases to move them.
5. The actuator re-engages the locking mechanism.
6. Detection is made for both switch blades and the
lock, automatically shutting down and isolating
the actuator.
Most POE designs offer combined actuation, lock-
ing of both switch rails and full detection through
single combined motion mechanisms. The turnout is
considered unsafe without a detected position, even
though both switch rails may be locked in the correct
position. Without detection, the interlocking cannot
clear the route, and trains are prevented from passing
the switch. This has the effect that, even for functional
switches, signals on the approach must show restrict-
ive aspects when the switch is moving, representing a
capacity constraint explored by Bemment et al.16 and
in a report by the Transportation Research Board.17
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a
detailed discussion of switch design and operation;
this is extensively covered in literature. Full details
of switch design and operation are presented by
Morgan1 and Cope and Ellis.18 Bemment et al.7 pro-
vide a list of the functional requirements of track
switching solutions.
Asset reliability: The magnitude of the problem
Data are published by the United Kingdom’s ORR
(Office of Road and Rail19) pertaining to the reliabil-
ity of the existing switch installations. An excerpt of
these data is reproduced in Table 1 to illustrate the
magnitude of the issue of switch reliability facing the
GB mainline. This table includes a breakdown of
the number of failure incidents over financial years
(FY) 07/08–11/12. The delay minute total is the sum
of all delays, to all trains, caused as a direct result of
an asset failure. The cost data are calculated as the
sum of the total of delay minute compensation,
Figure 1. Typical switch arrangement, taken from Bemment
et al.13 1: stock rails; 2: moveable switch rails; 3: stretcher bars;
4: common crossing; 5: check rails; 6: straight route; 7: turnout
route; 8: POE (points operating equipment), line-side type
shown; 9: drive bar and drive stretcher; 10: detector rods.
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essentially the compensation paid by the network cus-
todian to the train operators for unscheduled down-
time. This figure does not allow for the subsequent
economic impact of any such failure. It can be
observed that track switch failures are the second big-
gest contributor – both financially and in time – after
track faults, at around £26m/FY.
Baseline data
Mainline failure logging
Network Rail keeps records of all known asset failure
events in a database called ‘FMS’ (Fault Management
System). This database contains many fields which are
relevant to this study. The database records both
faults and failures, identifying the difference between
the two with a ‘criticality index’ between 1 and 4.
Criticality indices 1 to 3 represent failures requiring
immediate rectification. Index 4 is a known fault,
which will need rectifying when possible, but one
which has not yet developed to a system failure.
The data held by FMS do not include the number
of delay minutes incurred (or subsequent monetary
cost) for individual failure events; these data are
held in a separate database called TRUST, without
historical cross-referencing. Data are entered by
human operators, often line-side and in difficult con-
ditions, and as such there is a significant portion of
records which may be incomplete or considered cor-
rupt. Data accuracy improves considerably after 2009
when free-text entry was replaced by option selection
in several fields.
Dataset for this study
For this study, Network Rail provided a dataset
extracted directly from FMS. This consisted of a
database query for all entries pertaining to Points
for dates between 1 April 2008 and 17 September
2011. This resulted in 39,339 fault/failure records,
which were supplied in CSV format. The popula-
tion of switches on the UK mainline was 21,602
in 2011,20 but has stayed broadly constant during
the period, and populations will be considered
constant throughout this analysis. These data cor-
respond to a cumulative operating time of 74,800
years.
Cleansing the dataset
Since the data were directly extracted from the data-
base, extensive processing was required before use.
Of the obtained fields, several fields contain duplicate
information, but not every field was populated for
every record; therefore, identifying these duplicates
was important for data cleansing. First, a script was
created which back-populated missing fields based on
the contents of populated entries, in order to give a
more complete dataset. Certain switch types were then
excluded from the data due to specialist applications,
for example, those with very small populations or
obsolete technology already being phased out (e.g.
pneumatic machines). Hydraulic derailers, identified
as switches in the database, were also discounted.
Table 2 shows the number of records discounted for
each reason.
Table 2. General statistics showing size of pre- and post-
cleansing dataset obtained from Network Rail for the period
1 April 2008 and 17 September 2011.
Total records obtained/analysed 39,339
Minus
Blank/insufficient data/corrupted/irrelevant 966
Pneumatic machines 1,519
GRS Type 5 machines 253
Remaining useable data records 36,601
Of which:
Criticality 1–3 (service affecting failure) 17,603
Criticality 4 (non-service affecting) 18,998
Within the useable data
Unique Switch assets identified 12,042
(from an analysed population of) 19,915
Switches without a failure event in the period 9,560
Showing only a single failure event 4,756
Showing two failure events 2,516
Showing three failure events 1,567
Showing four or more failure events 3,203
Table 1. Cost and delay minute incursion for various asset
types.
Cost Delay minutes
Asset type (MGBP) % (1,000 s) %
Track 131.9 19.2 3,977 18.8
Switches 121.1 17.6 3,874 18.3
Track circuits 99.5 14.5 3,208 15.2
Signalling system 95.2 13.9 2,727 12.9
Electrification 75.4 11.0 1,529 7.2
Signals 40.2 5.9 1,428 6.8
Cabling 37.4 5.4 1,013 4.8
Track TSRs 34.5 5.0 1,630 7.7
Axle counters 18.5 2.7 495 2.3
Level crossings 13.2 1.9 521 2.5
Other signalling 11.6 1.7 363 1.7
Telecoms 9.1 1.3 363 1.7
Totals 687.8 21,128
Values are totals for period FY07–08 and FY11–12. Public domain
obtained from Office of Road and Rail.16
MGBP: Great Britain Pounds; TSR: Temporary Speed Restriction.
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Subsystem identification and event assignment
Understanding the design and operation of switches
allows their decomposition into a number of func-
tional subsystems for further analysis. The division
of functionality into subsystems is in some cases, how-
ever, an exercise of engineering judgement, as some
components in switch designs can be seen to cross the
established subsystem boundaries. The subsystem div-
isions used for the modelling presented herein were
established as part of a series of workshops held in
2011–2013, with representatives from across the GB
rail industry, detailed in Bemment et al.7 The follow-
ing functional subsystems are identified; a shorthand
identifying letter is adopted for each, and the relation-
ship between these subsystems is shown in Figure 2:
. (A) Actuation: Elements for moving the track
between positions and actuating the locking mech-
anism: actuator/gearing, transfer of power/motion,
including backdrive arrangements.
. (C) Control/Power: Elements which locally control
the other subsystems and provide power: signalling
relays, transformers, back-up supplies.
. (D)Detection: Elements which sense and transmit the
position of the switch rails and lock back to the con-
trol system: microswitches, contacts, Linear Variable
Differential Transformer(LVDT).
. (H) Human: Humans responsible for the design,
maintenance and operation of the switch, including
fault finding and repairs.
. (L) Locking: Elements which prevent the un-com-
manded movement of one or both switch blades:
lock bodies, lock dogs, associated mechanisms.
. (P) Permanent Way: Elements which support and
guide vehicles, maintain the gauge and alignment
of the track: stretcher bars, track clips, slide
chairs.
Several designs of POE are analysed. ‘Mechanical’
refers to those switches driven by rod from signalbox
levers or ground frame, and subsystem interactions
therefore differ slightly from Figure 2. HW and W63
designs are both electromechanical in nature. They
are from different suppliers and have different internal
designs and components. The source data do not
explicitly distinguish between them, thus they remain
grouped herein. For the same reason, Clamplock
designs are grouped with Hydrive designs. Both
Clamplock and Hydrive are hydraulic POE designs
with a separate power pack and hoses linked to
rams between the running rails. The HPSS (high-
performance switch system) machines are the newest
design on Network Rail infrastructure and use a screw
jack actuator.
By comparing the switch type, assembly type and
component type identified in each dataset record, each
failure event can be assigned to a particular subsys-
tem, for a given POE type. The total number of rec-
ords in each assignment is shown in Table 3.
Note that it is not possible to separate the Locking
and Actuation functions in the HPSS machine, as the
locking is carried out by the same screw jack mechan-
ism within the actuation element; all failures have thus
been grouped under the Actuation category. Failure
counts for ‘Control/Power’ upon mechanical switches
are unrealistically low. This does not indicate a much
Figure 2. System context diagram showing relationship between functional subsystems, and where appropriate, their relationship
with the wider railway environment.
POE: points operating equipment.
Bemment et al. 1411
higher reliability, but instead that not every mechan-
ical switch is fitted with electronic interlocking; at the
time of analysis, data were not available on the por-
tion of the population with/without this feature.
Establishing failure rates and
distributions
Operational reliability – Definition
It is necessary to distinguish between unsafe failures
(i.e. resulting in a system in an unsafe state), oper-
ational failures and faults when discussing the reliabil-
ity of safety critical systems. Literature on the topic
can cause confusion by representing any and all by the
terms Mean Time Between/To Failure, abbreviated
‘MTBF’ or ‘MTTF’. The time between unsafe failures
is not considered any further herein, but these are
essentially undetected failures which make the switch
dangerous to traffic. These would be included in oper-
ational failures, but are comparatively so rare as not
to affect the analysis.
. MTTSAF – Mean Time to Service Affecting
Failure, describes how often the system can be
expected to suffer a failure which is service affecting
(operational reliability).
. MTTFRI – Mean Time to Fault Requiring
Intervention, describes the frequency that mainten-
ance crews must visit the asset to rectify faults and
failures.
. MTTR – Mean Time to Repair – the mean time
from notification of a failed asset (or subsystem
thereof) to returning that asset or subsystem to
an as-good-as-new state.
MTTSAF and MTTFRI figures are included here
as they are used as a de-facto measure within industry;
however, when comparing skewed distributions, the
50% survivor function, or B50, provides a better indi-
cator. Unless otherwise stated, the B50 refers to service
affecting failures. B50 indicates the time at which half
the population is expected to have failed, i.e. the
median.
MTTR is difficult to quantify as the actual repair
time for operational failures (i.e. the time the switch is
unavailable following a failure in use) is not recorded
by the infrastructure operator. For this modelling
exercise, the mean number of ‘delay minutes’ per inci-
dent will be used – 106min. The calculation, and attri-
bution, of delay minutes to particular faults is not
through a particular scientific process, but values pro-
vided in Table 1 are used herein to provide a first
estimate of MTTR of the correct order of magnitude.
More accurate knowledge of the distribution of
MTTR figures would be of significant benefit to
such a study, especially in the case of different subsys-
tems having very different repair times. However, with
the absence of further information, the influence of
this figure upon the results has been mitigated by
assuming a constant throughout.
Constant failure rates
Assuming a constant failure rate, the well-known equa-
tions (equations (1) to (3)) presented by Hecht10 can be
used to calculate MTTSAF and MTTFRI figures for
each subsystem and assembly using the data in Table 3.
Equation (1) expresses the sum of the operational time
between events (TTF) and observational suspensions
(TTS) for each failure event (NFT) in the total (NSAF
or NFRI) and observational suspension event (NST),
divided by the number of observed failure events (NF).
An observational suspension, sometimes referred to as a
censored lifetime, is a subsystem reaching the end of the
observation window in a functional or repaired state;
the asset is known not to have failed in that period, but
its exact point of failure subsequent to the observation
period is unknown. In the case of a fixed observation
window across all assets, as here, this can be simplified
to equations (2) and (3), including the known popula-
tion (P) and observation time window (T). For a con-
stant failure rate, the rate can be expressed as the
reciprocal of the mean, as per equations (4) and (5).
MTTF ¼
PNFT
i¼1 TTFi þ
PNST
j¼1 TTSj
NF
ð1Þ
Table 3. Switch populations and fault/failure incidence count for each subsystem classification within each switch type, for the period
1 April 2008 and 17 September 2011.
POE type (Pop)
All recorded fault/failure incidents (FRI) Service affecting failures only (SAF)
A C D H L P Total A C D H L P Total
Clamplock/
Hydrive
6,852 5,412 1,780 2,358 256 5,129 885 15,821 2,494 921 1,120 115 2,235 346 7,231
HPSS 599 345 548 872 32 – 20 1,817 175 328 601 17 – 13 1,134
HW/W63 9,153 5,799 2,607 2,681 349 1,483 1,687 14,606 2,874 1,466 1,327 178 778 655 7,278
Mechanical 3,311 2,102 52 1,251 50 837 66 4,357 656 23 494 21 320 18 1,533
Total 19,915 13,658 4,987 7,162 687 7,449 2,658 36,601 6,200 2,738 3,542 331 3,332 1,033 17,176
POE: points operating equipment.
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MTTSAF ¼ P T
NSAF
ð2Þ
MTTFRI ¼ P T
NFRI
ð3Þ
lSAF ¼ 1
MTTSAF
ð4Þ
lFRI ¼ 1
MTTFRI
ð5Þ
SAFB50 ¼ ln 2lSAF ð6Þ
FRIB50 ¼ ln 2lFRI ð7Þ
The results of these calculations are tabulated in
Table 4. Mean times calculated in this way are indi-
cative only of the relative unreliability contribution of
each subsystem to the whole system and of the relative
reliability of the different POE designs. To provide
baseline values for comparison with variable-
frequency analysis later in the paper, the B50 values
of the same assets are shown in Table 5. The B50
values in Table 5 have been derived from equations
(6) and (7), which are valid under the assumption of
constant failure rates only. All B50 values calculated
as part of the later, variable failure rate analysis
are established as part of the Monte-Carlo modelling
process.
Lifetime distribution selection
A range of suitable variable failure rate models
were evaluated upon the data, including 2P- and 3P-
Weibull, Gamma, Normal and 1P- and 2P-
Exponential, using a correlation coefficient test and
the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach
described below. For each subset of data, the 2P- or
3P-Weibull distribution proved the best fit for the data.
The Weibull distribution is a general purpose reli-
ability distribution used to model times-to-failure of
electronic and mechanical components, equipment or
systems. The 2P-Weibull distribution, described by
Hecht,10 has two parameters, the shape factor b and
the characteristic life, or scale parameter, . Equations
(8) and (9) show the relationship between the failure
frequency and failure rate and the distribution param-
eters at given time, t. b indicates whether a subsystem
has a tendency towards early-life, ‘infant mortality’
failures (5 1), constant failure rate (b¼ 1) or late-
life, ‘wear-out’ failures 4 1.  indicates the scale of
the probability density function in time, a larger 
indicating a longer time to failure; though noting
that  values are not directly comparable, as they
Table 4. MTTFRI and MTTSAF figures for functional subsystems of different POE types upon the GB mainline network, calculated
using data sampled between 1 April 2008 and 17 September 2011.
MTTFRI (years) MTTSAF (years)
A C D H L P All A C D H L P All
Clamplock/Hydrive 4.4 13.3 10.1 92.7 4.6 26.8 1.5 9.5 25.8 21.2 206.1 10.6 68.5 3.3
HPSS 6.0 3.8 2.4 65.0 n/a 102.2 1.1 11.8 6.3 3.5 121.1 n/a 157.4 1.8
HW/W63 5.5 12.1 11.8 90.6 21.4 18.8 2.2 11.0 21.6 23.9 178.4 40.7 48.3 4.4
Mechanical 5.5 219.9 9.2 230.9 13.7 174.3 2.6 17.5 490.6 23.2 548.3 35.8 621.4 7.5
All 5.0 13.8 9.6 100.3 9.3 25.9 1.9 11.1 25.2 19.5 208.4 20.7 66.7 4.0
MTTSAF: mean time to service affecting failure, describes how often the system can be expected to suffer a failure which is service affecting (operational
reliability); MTTFRI: mean time to fault requiring intervention, describes the frequency that maintenance crews must visit the asset to rectify faults and
failures.
Table 5. B50 figures corresponding to the MTTSAF and MTTFRI figures presented in Table 4.
FRIB50 (years) SAFB50 (years)
A C D H L P All A C D H L P All
Clamplock/Hydrive 3.0 9.2 7.0 64.3 3.2 18.6 1.0 6.6 17.9 14.7 142.8 7.4 47.4 2.3
HPSS 4.2 2.6 1.6 45.1 n/a 70.8 0.8 8.2 4.4 2.4 83.9 n/a 109.1 1.3
HW/W63 3.8 8.4 8.2 62.8 14.8 13.0 1.5 7.6 15.0 16.5 123.6 28.2 33.5 3.0
Mechanical 3.8 152.4 6.4 160.0 9.5 120.8 1.8 12.1 340.0 16.1 380.0 24.8 430.7 5.2
All 3.5 9.6 6.7 69.6 6.4 18.0 1.3 7.7 17.4 13.5 144.5 14.3 46.2 2.8
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depend upon the corresponding b value. The
3P-Weibull distribution also requires , which repre-
sents an offset in time for the origin of the curve.
In the analysed cases where the 3P-Weibull distri-
bution proved most suitable, it did so with an offset
parameter which was insignificantly small; therefore,
the 2P-Weibull was selected as the most suitable dis-
tribution for this modelling exercise. Published work
by Rama and Andrews21 obtains a similar though
more targeted dataset from the same source and fits
distributions to the grouped data. The work also
establishes that the Weibull distribution is the most
appropriate distribution to model switch component
lifetimes and also selects the two-parameter model
over the three-parameter model for the same reasons.
One drawback of the Weibull function is that it is
not capable of exhibiting non-monotonic shapes in
the hazard function. This means the bathtub curve,
typically observed over a whole component and popu-
lation lifetime, cannot be replicated. However, this
drawback is offset by the sample period being across
a range of component ages, and the use of confidence
intervals to give an indication of the goodness-of-fit of
the distributions identified.
Rama and Andrews21 also list a number of
assumptions which need to be made when modelling
lifetime distributions in this way, namely:
1. Each failure is rectified by repairing or replacing
the failed component.
2. Equipment can either be in a good (operational)
or bad (failed) state.
3. Repair/replacement returns components to the as-
good-as-new state.
4. Times to failure of individual components are
independent of each other.
5. Time duration of the component in the failed
state is insignificant in comparison to the function-
ing period.
f ðtÞ ¼ 

t

 1
eð
t
Þ ð8Þ
lðtÞ ¼ 

t

 1
ð9Þ
B50 ¼ ðlnð2ÞÞ1 ð10Þ
MTTSAFWeibull ¼ SAF 1þ 1
SAF
  
ð11Þ
Distribution fitting process
First, records were grouped by each unique asset and
then placed upon failure event timelines. The output
from this process is, for each established subsystem/
switch type group, an array of ‘time to event’ figures,
where the event is either a failure or suspension of
test. This process was automated using an iterative
script; however, due to historical changes in data
entry methods, significant manual intervention was
also required. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the
time-to-failure data for all Clamplock/Hydrive fail-
ures. Figure 4 shows the cumulative proportion of
observed failures over time; as the gradient of the
Figure 3. Histogram of all Clamplock/Hydrive failure intervals.
1414 Proc IMechE Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit 232(5)
plot is shallower with time, it indicates that the failure
pattern tends towards infant mortality.
The output arrays can be used as the input to an
MLE algorithm. MLE is an estimator technique suit-
able for data that have a relatively high portion of
observational suspensions; the proportion of observa-
tional suspensions in these data prevents the use of
other techniques, e.g. rank regression. MLE works by
developing a likelihood function based on sampling the
data and by finding the values of parameter estimates
that maximise this likelihood function. It is an iterative
method. The process is well established and docu-
mented, for example by Scholz.22 b and  values were
established (for service affecting failures only) in each
of the subsystems in each switch classification, and the
computed values are tabulated in Table 6. Values of
the parameters at the extremes of a 90% confidence
interval are also provided to indicate the goodness of
fit. Table 6 also lists the computed B50 values for each
subsystem, and (for the sake of compatibility with
existing practice only) the computed MTTSAF
values, also with 90% confidence intervals. The calcu-
lation of these values for a given 2P-Weibull distribu-
tion uses equations (10) and (11), where  represents
the Gamma function. An example of a fitted exponen-
tial model for failure distributions, for the Actuation
subsystem of an HW/W63 machine type, is plotted in
Figure 5. Figure 6 is a plot of the same failure data,
with a fitted 2P-Weibull distribution. These two plots
illustrate the relative unsuitability of the constant fail-
ure rate model with these data.
Analysis of fitted distributions
. The distributions reveal HPSS – the most modern
POE type – to be the least reliable solution, and
mechanical points, the oldest approach, to be
the most reliable. The low reliability of HPSS
may be due to the observation window coinciding
with the roll out of HPSS, and the subsequent final
development and testing period with live traffic.
A more recent observation window would be
required to confirm this.
. The models established in Table 6 can be compared
to those independently established by Rama and
Andrews.21 Notably, the shape parameter 5 1
indicates a high infant mortality rate. There are
some differences between the B50 values in the con-
stant and variable failure rate models.
. Comparing the values presented in Table 5 with
those in Table 6 indicates that assuming a constant
failure rate when modelling switch failures is not an
ideal approach, as in all cases the whole-system b
values are significantly less than 1 – a conclusion
which further agrees with those of Rama and
Andrews.21 This indicates that the accuracy of
many predict-and-prevent models used by industry
could be significantly improved with the use of
variable failure rates.
. Comparing the values presented in Table 5 with
those in Table 6 further highlights the weakness
of the industry-standard MTTSAF measure – the
MTTSAF for mechanical switches at almost
50 years, for instance, would be a misleading
value for an asset manager, when considering the
B50 is nearer to 10 years.
. Most elements show a tendency towards 5 1, indi-
cating a higher incidence of early life failures. This is
not what is expected of an electromechanical device,
which would typically be seen to wear out in use.
Permanent way elements, with b approximately 1,
have a broadly constant failure rate.
Figure 4. Cumulative portion of all Clamplock/Hydrive failure events over observed time.
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Table 6. Calculated values of b, , B50 and MTTSAF, including 90% confidence intervals, tabulated by POE type and subsystem type.
Service affecting failures only
A C D H L P All
Clamplock/Hydrive blower 0.716 0.750 0.674 1.268 0.709 0.809 0.636
b 0.738 0.789 0.707 1.477 0.732 0.882 0.647
bupper 0.760 0.829 0.740 1.707 0.755 0.959 0.658
lower 4,639 12,822 13,920 13,267 5,329 26,688 1,332
 (days) 4,940 14,739 15,941 19,418 5,713 35,548 1,374
upper 5,276 17,104 18,434 30,914 6,144 49,022 1,417
B50,lower 7.8 22.5 23.2 29.3 8.9 49.8 2.1
B50 (years) 8.2 25.4 26.0 41.5 9.5 64.3 2.1
B50,upper 8.7 28.8 29.4 63.5 10.1 85.6 2.2
MTTSAFlower 15.3 40.0 47.4 33.3 17.7 77.5 5.0
MTTSAF (years) 16.3 46.2 54.8 48.1 19.0 103.7 5.2
MTTSAFupper 17.5 54.0 64.0 75.4 20.6 143.7 5.3
HPSS blower 0.594 0.519 0.599 0.641 n/a 0.809 0.545
b 0.671 0.564 0.637 0.967 n/a 1.253 0.569
bupper 0.754 0.612 0.676 1.389 n/a 1.836 0.593
lower 6,481 3,496 1,492 15,058 n/a 8,756 644
 (days) 8,641 4,243 1,671 47,391 n/a 22,730 701
upper 12,130 5,267 1,887 326,420 n/a 119,097 766
B50,lower 22.9 5.1 2.3 31.5 n/a 19.6 0.9
B50 (years) 31.2 6.1 2.6 88.9 n/a 46.5 1.0
B50,upper 45.2 7.3 2.9 509.1 n/a 208.7 1.1
MTTSAFlower 10.8 15.3 5.7 41.7 n/a 22.8 2.8
MTTSAF (years) 13.7 19.1 6.4 131.7 n/a 58.0 3.1
MTTSAFupper 18.2 24.4 7.3 914.0 n/a 292.4 3.4
HW/W63 blower 0.643 0.771 0.622 1.454 0.594 1.199 0.600
b 0.662 0.804 0.650 1.652 0.629 1.275 0.611
bupper 0.682 0.838 0.679 1.866 0.667 1.354 0.622
lower 7,388 11,327 22,576 10,515 51,175 8,277 2,211
 (days) 7,953 12,645 26,253 13,991 65,123 9,405 2,293
upper 8,592 14,207 30,800 19,611 84,455 10,805 2,378
B50,lower 11.8 20.0 35.9 23.7 80.7 17.3 3.3
B50 (years) 12.5 22.0 40.9 30.7 99.7 19.3 3.4
B50,upper 13.4 24.3 46.9 41.8 125.2 21.8 3.6
MTTSAFlower 26.9 34.9 83.5 26.1 195.2 21.1 8.9
MTTSAF (years) 29.2 39.1 98.3 34.3 252.9 23.9 9.2
MTTSAFupper 31.7 44.1 116.8 47.3 334.5 27.3 9.6
Mechanical blower 0.512 0.690 0.649 1.151 0.554 0.910 0.474
b 0.544 1.011 0.698 1.641 0.608 1.360 0.494
bupper 0.578 1.417 0.751 2.253 0.665 1.938 0.513
lower 20,682 43,684 16,604 11,066 43,218 17,734 6,706
 (days) 25,687 188,915 20,797 25,454 62,510 56,200 7,531
upper 32,496 2,022,138 26,696 93,985 94,833 381,088 8,505
B50,lower 29.9 92.2 27.8 25.7 67.9 40.2 8.9
B50 (years) 35.9 360.2 33.7 55.8 93.7 117.6 9.8
B50,upper 43.8 3,269.6 41.8 187.6 134.9 699.8 10.9
MTTSAFlower 95.3 119.3 56.9 27.9 169.7 45.7 36.9
MTTSAF (years) 121.8 515.3 72.3 62.4 253.3 141.0 42.3
MTTSAFupper 158.9 5,504.0 94.3 219.9 398.0 916.2 48.8
(continued)
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. An electro-mechanical or electro-hydraulic element
showing high infant mortality is an indication of
three main possible failure contributors. First, that
insufficient burn-in testing is being completed.
Second, that there are negative human factors
with regard to installation and adjustment, which
lead to the components operating outside a design
envelope. Third, that the components have not
been designed for the correct operating environ-
ment. Further analysis would be required to estab-
lish which particular cause (or combination
thereof) was prevalent.
Table 6. Continued
Service affecting failures only
A C D H L P All
All blower 0.641 0.729 0.626 1.443 0.661 1.021 0.595
b 0.654 0.751 0.643 1.576 0.679 1.073 0.601
bupper 0.667 0.774 0.660 1.717 0.698 1.127 0.608
lower 11,035 16,225 17,562 13,109 15,862 16,625 1,962
 (days) 11,675 17,767 19,115 16,281 17,225 19,090 2,008
upper 12,364 19,520 20,882 20,770 18,770 22,139 2,055
B50,lower 17.4 27.6 27.5 29.0 25.6 32.9 2.9
B50 (years) 18.3 29.9 29.6 35.3 27.5 37.2 3.0
B50,upper 19.2 32.4 31.9 44.2 29.6 42.4 3.1
MTTSAFlower 40.8 52.6 66.1 32.5 56.3 44.4 8.0
MTTSAF (years) 43.4 57.9 72.4 40.0 61.5 50.9 8.3
MTTSAFupper 46.2 63.9 79.8 50.6 67.5 58.9 8.5
Figure 5. Best-fit line for exponential failure distribution (i.e. constant failure rate) of Actuation subsystem of HW/W63 machine
class, showing a considerable deviation from observed data.
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. ‘Human error’ failures – that is, failures directly
attributable to human error rather than those
manifesting themselves through the failure of a
component – have a relatively high beta.
However, the confidence bands of these values
are very wide, as there are relatively few failures
attributable to this cause. As there is no obvious
reason the likelihood of human error should
increase with time, it may prove a better approach
in future work to fit a constant failure rate model
to this element.
. Note that values in the ‘all’ column are calculated
using all data points for a given machine to con-
struct a distribution, which because of the mix of b
values discovered is not an accurate method, a
better method being the mixed-Weibull, which is
used for the baseline models in the next section.
These subsystem models can now be used to evalu-
ate the benefits of a redundant approach.
Fault tolerance through redundancy
Modelling approach
With the b and  values established in the previous
section, conceptual designs featuring redundancy of
subsystems can now be modelled. This modelling
takes an RBD approach. An RBD represents a
system by a series of blocks; each block can be in a
‘functional’ or ‘failed’ state. The system is considered
to be in a functional state if a path can be created
from start (left) to end (right) which encompasses
only blocks in the functional state. The modelling
considered here is purely analytical, that is it is
assumed that no repair of failed subsystems takes
place. Three examples of RBDs are provided graph-
ically in this paper; other combinations are repre-
sented in shorthand only. This shorthand notation
is adopted for brevity, whereby a number (represent-
ing number of channels) or fraction (representing
x-out-of-y redundancy) is followed by the abbrevi-
ation adopted for each subsystem as used in the
source data analysis. Figure 7 shows the baseline
example. This has a single instance of each subsystem
and would be termed A C D H L P in shorthand. As
all subsystems are connected in series, a failure of any
one will cause a system failure. Another arrangement
is shown in Figure 8, which has duplicate, triplicate
and 2-out-of-3 elements. The shorthand for this
implementation is 2/3A 2/3D 3L C 2P H.
Scenarios and strategy
. Actuation elements can be combined in parallel-
channel redundancy. A range of actuation options
Figure 6. 2-P Weibull failure distribution ( ¼ 0:662,  ¼ 7953) and 90% confidence interval of Actuation subsystem of HW/W63
machine class, showing a much closer correlation to the observed data than Figure 5.
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can be examined. Singular (i.e. current practice),
duplicate, triplicate (including 2-out-of-3) are con-
sidered here. However, actuators are also relatively
expensive. Cost is not calculated in this paper, but
2-out-of-3 may enable smaller/cheaper units to be
utilised.
. Control/Power elements could be paralleled in a
number of ways; however, it is anticipated that
x-out-of-y approaches would not be suitable due
to the complexity of the control signalling.
Therefore, the options examined are singular,
duplicate and triplicate.
. Detection elements can easily be paralleled.
However, the sole purpose of detection is to sense
the system state, so a problem exists in a duplicate
system showing two differing positions, which
would likely still be regarded as a failure. Options
considered are therefore singular, and the voting
systems 2-out-of-3 and 3-out-of-4. The processing
element is considered perfect.
. Human failures caused by human error must neces-
sarily form part of the system analysis. However, a
full analysis of the human factor elements of track
switch design, operation, maintenance and repair is
not part of this work (see ‘Future Work’ section).
The human element is therefore considered consist-
ent with existing practice.
. Locking elements can be paralleled. As the funda-
mental purpose of the lock means a failure could
lead to it preventing movement of the switch, it
could be deduced that paralleling this subsystem
may in fact reduce the overall system reliability.
However, in practice, nearly all lock failures
result from a lock failing to engage. For this
analysis, it is assumed there is an engineering
solution to this which enables locks to function
as separate units.7
. Permanent Way elements could be duplicated or
triplicated, but no voting approaches could apply
as these elements are entirely passive.
Another approach to be considered (for the power
operated points only) is the duplication, triplication
and 2-out-of-3 voting for several identical point
machines fitted to a single end. This would parallel
detection, actuation and locking channels grouped
together, in a larger framework of voting and process-
ing, again considered perfect. An example of this
approach is shown in Figure 9, the shorthand for
which is 3(ADL) C P H. These grouped elements
would each have an associated permanent way, con-
trol/power and human elements, which could take the
form of the strategies above. It is also not possible to
apply each of these strategies to each points type,
exceptions are:
. Actuation upon the mechanical points type consists
of rodding and cable runs from a lever frame to the
points. Therefore, a redundancy of actuators
would not be practicable.
. Control/Power elements upon mechanical points
type are rare, yet the failure distribution listed is
Figure 8. An example RBD showing replication of individual subsystems, with 2-out-of-3 voting (for actuation and detection),
triplication (locking) and duplication (permanent way).
Figure 7. An example RBD showing the baseline case, with a single subsystem of each category. As all subsystems are connected in
series, a failure of any one will cause a system failure.
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very low as it is for the whole population analysed.
This has therefore been left as a singular item.
. Locking elements upon HPSS points type are com-
bined with actuation as established earlier.
When all possible approaches listed above are com-
bined, there are approximately 350 possible permuta-
tions per machine type. For brevity, therefore, this
paper will present a baseline machine and several con-
cepts for each machine type, demonstrating the most
reliable scenarios in each case. Many architectures are
evaluated as each will incur a different monetary cost;
evaluating relative cost is the subject of further work.
The scenarios were selected by way of a sensitivity
analysis of each subsystem, which iteratively exam-
ined the static contribution to unreliability of each
subsystem. The process for creating the distributions
is based on the Monte-Carlo approach. The com-
pleted RBDs are used, with random inputs, to predict
first failure times of the system. This process is
repeated until a dataset of 500 simulated failure
points is created, for each combination. This dataset
can then be subject to the same MLE process detailed
earlier, in order to calculate the b and  parameters,
and B50 values. For completeness, MTTSAF figures
are also calculated. Note that this is a different
method to that used to calculate the ‘All’ column in
Table 4, which was to fit a single 2P-Weibull distribu-
tion to a dataset which was known to be a mix of
different distributions. The results of the two pro-
cesses are therefore expected to be marginally differ-
ent. Table 4 can be used to validate the Monte-Carlo
approach.
Static versus dynamic analysis
One of the benefits of a multi-channel approach is
that the system continues to function until such a
time as a repair has been effected, unless all channels
fail simultaneously. Whilst a static analysis can reveal
the expected system reliability, a more relevant meas-
ure can be obtained from a dynamic simulation –
using the same RBD and Monte-Carlo approach –
to establish the availability. To establish availability,
the benchmark MTTR is used as the time to fix any
failed subcomponent. As the failure distributions are
significantly time-variant, the dynamic simulations
are run over an observation window of 25 years (a typ-
ical asset lifetime for a switch installation) and the
mean unavailability per annum, in minutes, taken as
a measure for comparison. Note that this availability
figure relates to unscheduled downtime only and does
not allow for scheduled maintenance downtime,
which is considered part of the system.
Analysis
The results of the static modelling are presented in
Table 7. The results of the dynamic modelling are
presented in the right-hand column of Table 7.
The B50 figures show that redundancy can provide a
considerable improvement over baseline for every
POE type. The mean annual downtime for each
redundantly engineered solution is an order of mag-
nitude lower than the baseline scenario. The following
further points are of note:
. Industry practice is to use mean-times as a meas-
ure of reliability. However, with highly skewed dis-
tributions, as calculated here, this measure can
be significantly misleading. This paper suggests
use of the B50 value as a more representative meas-
ure, whether or not failure rates are considered
constant.
. In all cases, parallel redundancy of functional sub-
systems acts to improve overall system reliability.
. For HPSS, fitting three machines in a parallel
configuration results in a fivefold improvement in
B50 value.
Figure 9. An example RBD showing parallel replication of whole POE units, wherein each unit has actuation, locking and detection
elements.
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. For the HW/W63 electromechanical machines, up
to 12.5 year B50 values are achievable, a fivefold
improvement.
. For Clamplock/Hydrive types, B50 can also exceed
10 years, also a fivefold improvement.
. As expected, different architectures have different
effects upon whole system reliability. To select a
suitable architecture for a given situation, cost con-
straints must also be taken into account, alongside
the maintenance and repair policy.
. Figure 10 shows the relative reliability importance
of each subsystem type, for the HW/W63 baseline
example. Reliability importance is calculated as the
subsystem reliability divided by system reliability
and gives an indication of how likely a failure of
that subsystem is to cause a system failure. It can
be seen that for the series case, the failure of any
block is of similar likelihood to cause a system fail-
ure at any point in the observation window. This
result is to be expected for a series system.
Table 7. b, , MTTSAF and B50 values for a selection of redundantly engineered switch solutions based upon existing POE types.
Machine type
Concept
structure
Static Dynamic
b  MTTSAF B50 Mean Unavailibility
(days) (years) (years) (min per annum)
Clamplock/Hydrive A C D H L P (Baseline) 0.750 1,136 3.7 1.9 24.1
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 2L 2P 1.253 2,587 6.7 5.1 1.3
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P 1.276 2,861 7.4 5.7 1.3
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 2L 2P 1.252 2,345 6.1 4.7 1.3
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 3L 2P 1.270 2,572 6.6 5.2 1.3
3A 3C 2/3D H 2L 2P 1.353 4,181 10.6 8.6 1.3
3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P 1.468 4,802 12.1 10.0 1.3
3A 3C 3/4D H 2L 2P 1.319 3,603 9.2 7.3 1.3
3A 3C 3/4D H 3L 2P 1.393 4,088 10.3 8.5 1.3
2/3(ADL) 3C H 2P 1.152 1,319 3.6 2.5 1.3
3(ADL) 3C H 2P 1.431 3,610 7.3 9.3 1.3
HPSS A C D H P (Baseline) 0.623 555 2.1 0.9 36.2
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 2P 1.055 1,104 2.1 3.1 0.9
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 2P 1.037 710 2.0 1.3 0.9
3A 3C 2/3D H 2P 1.033 1,261 3.5 2.3 0.8
3A 3C 3/4D H 3P 1.020 770 2.2 1.4 0.9
2/3(AD) 3C H 2P 1.026 863 2.5 1.6 0.9
3(AD) 3C H 2P 1.256 2,531 6.7 4.9 0.9
HW/W63 A C D H L P (Baseline) 0.716 1,568 5.0 2.7 18.9
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 2L 2P 1.036 3,618 9.5 7.1 1.8
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P 1.035 3,682 9.7 7.3 1.8
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 2L 2P 1.037 3,251 8.6 6.4 1.9
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 3L 2P 1.036 3,303 8.8 6.5 1.9
3A 3C 2/3D H 2L 2P 1.114 5,845 14.7 12.2 1.7
3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P 1.119 5,995 15.0 12.5 1.7
3A 3C 3/4D H 2L 3P 1.086 5,025 12.8 10.3 1.9
3A 3C 3/4D H 3L 2P 1.078 5,143 13.1 10.6 1.8
2/3(ADL) 3C H 2P 0.989 2,398 6.6 4.5 1.9
3(ADL) 3C H 2P 1.155 5,603 14.1 11.6 1.8
Mechanical A C D H L P (Baseline) 0.621 3,357 12.5 5.3 8.1
A C 2/3D H 2L 2P 0.685 5,193 16.6 9.0 3.7
A C 2/3D H 3L 2P 0.680 5,412 17.3 9.4 3.6
A C 3/4D H 2L 2P 0.716 4,148 12.8 7.3 3.9
A C 3/4D H 3L 2P 0.713 4,282 13.3 7.5 3.7
A 2/3(DL) C H 2P 0.713 3,967 12.5 6.9 3.8
A 3(DL) 3C H 2P 0.648 7,090 23.1 12.4 3.8
MTTSAF: mean time to service affecting failure, describes how often the system can be expected to suffer a failure which is service affecting (operational
reliability).
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. Figure 11 shows the relative reliability importance
for a sample case, 3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P of the
HW/W63 POE type. The importance of all phys-
ical subsystems has been considerably reduced,
indicating a good fault tolerance. However, the
human element is now of dominant importance
throughout the observation window. The same is
true for all evaluated architectures, as it is not pos-
sible to add redundancy to the human element in the
same way. There is also the possibility that the
Human element would be less reliable with a
multi-channel system, as the extra complexity may
lead to additional human error. Adding additional
redundancy beyond that explored herein does not
significantly further improve system reliability, as
the Human element becomes the limiting factor.
This result is important in indicating that when
implementing functionally redundant track switch-
ing solutions, human factors elements are important
in gaining the full reliability benefits. Any neglect of
human factors in this instance may mean that there
may be no reliability improvement at all.
. The results of the dynamic modelling show that an
order of magnitude reduction in unscheduled
downtime is possible across all asset types, when
a functionally redundant design approach is taken.
. The dynamic modelling also shows that the par-
ticular architecture has a relatively insignificant
effect upon the unscheduled downtime for each
switch type. This is because the likelihood of par-
allel channels failing concurrently, within the com-
paratively short MTTR, is diminishingly small.
. The main contributor to the unscheduled down-
time in each scenario is errors directly attributable
to humans. This is further highlighted in Figure 11.
HPSS performs better than the other drive types in
the mean unavailability per annum due to the fact
the eta value for human-induced failures is much
higher – there is less likelihood of error as the
machine has built-in monitoring and diagnostics.
. As theMTTR is insignificantly small when compared
with the MTTSAF, there may be some scope in a
multi-channel architecture to respond to subsystem
failures in a much longer time frame – perhaps weeks
or months – without having a significant detrimental
effect upon availability. Further modelling work will
be necessary to establish this relationship.
. This modelling has not considered the practical
limitations to implementation. Of note is the
fact that providing redundancy in locking with
existing designs may not be possible. A novel
design of locking system allowing multiple
Figure 10. Reliability Importance of each subsystem type for baseline case of HW/W63 machine type, over 20 years of operation.
As it is a series system, all elements contribute similar levels of unreliability at each point in time.
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channels would therefore be required. The pro-
posed ‘REPOINT’ design, first presented in
Bemment et al.,7 is one option which enables a
redundancy of locking systems.
Conclusions
This paper has established that adopting a fault tol-
erant approach to railway track switching is able to
bring considerable gains in reliability and availability.
Reliability of track switches is a problem on the UK
mainline, causing much delay to trains and with an
associated cost to the infrastructure manager. This
paper has analysed failure data from the UK mainline
infrastructure custodian, covering 74,800 years of
operation, in order to establish failure distribution
parameters and reliability figures for different switch
machine types when decomposed into their functional
subsystems. These parameters have then been used as
inputs to a range of RBD models which establish ana-
lytically the increase to reliability possible when
taking a parallel-subsystem approach to fault toler-
ance. The results show that considerable gains in
whole-system reliability are demonstrated in a range
of possible implementations; typical time to failures
can be more than five times that of existing solutions,
and unscheduled downtime reduced by an order of
magnitude. However, as equipment failures are engin-
eered out, switch reliability can be seen to plateau.
This is due to the dominant contributor to unreliabil-
ity becoming human error, which cannot be designed
out in the same manner. As considerable reliability
gains are demonstrated, this paper makes a strong
case for developing track switch designs utilising func-
tional redundancy. The potential impact of such
designs on reliability and availability is significant.
Future work
Future work investigating fault tolerant track switch-
ing will centre around three main areas:
. Dynamic reliability modelling of suggested archi-
tectures for fault tolerant track switching solutions.
The work contained herein is analytical only, and
clearly one of the main benefits to the implementa-
tion of parallel-channel redundancy is the exten-
sion of the window where repair/replacement can
occur. This work will require extensive modelling
but build directly upon the failure distributions
established in this paper.
Figure 11. Reliability Importance of each subsystem type for 3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P case of HW/W63 machine type, over 20 years of
operation. System reliability is dominated by human error over the entire time period.
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. A more detailed engineering appraisal of the phys-
ical constraints of fault tolerant track switching
needs to be carried out. This paper does not con-
sider for example the space, cost or time constraints
within which the track switching solutions must per-
form, or indeed whether engineering a physical
embodiment of the proposed redundant architec-
tures is possible.
. Seek a greater understanding of the human factors
elements of track switch installation, maintenance
and repair. In any future implementation, minimis-
ing the human contribution to failures will be just
as important as engineering out service affecting
failures, as demonstrated by this paper.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to extend their gratitude to the staff of
industrial and academic organisations who have contribu-
ted to the REPOINT study. Non-exclusively, and in no par-
ticular order: RSSB (Rail Safety and Standards Board),
Network Rail, TfL (Transport for London)/London
Underground, ATOC (Assocaition of Train Operating
Companies), Tracsis plc, NTEC (Nottingham Transport
Engineering Centre), Andy Foan Ltd, Progress Rail
Services (UK) Ltd, DfT (Department for Transport), and
the ORR (Office of Rail and Road).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial
support for the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article: The authors acknowledge the financial sup-
port provided by the United Kingdom EPSRC (Engineering
and Physical Sciences Research Council) and the United
Kingdom RSSB (Rail Safety and Standards Board) through
grant number EP/I010823/1 for the project ‘REPOINT:
Redundantly engineered points for enhanced reliability
and capacity of railway track switching’.
References
1. Morgan JC. British railway track, 7th edition, volume 1,
design part 2: switches and crossings. Derby, UK: The
Permanent Way Institution, 2009.
2. Ison S, Frost M and Watson R. UK rail transport: a
review of demand and supply. Proc Inst Civil Eng
Transport 2012; 165: 225–234.
3. Pellegrini P, Marlie`re G and Rodriguez J. Optimal train
routing and scheduling for managing traffic perturb-
ations in complex junctions. Transport Res B Meth
2014; 59: 58–80.
4. Garcı´a FP, Roberts C and Tobias AM. Railway point
mechanisms: condition monitoring and fault detection.
Proc IMechE, Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit 2010;
224: 35–44.
5. Silmon J and Roberts C. Improving switch reliability
with innovative condition monitoring techniques. Proc
IMechE, Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit 2010; 224:
293–302.
6. Garcı´a FP, Schmid F and Conde JC. A reliability cen-
tered approach to remote condition monitoring. A rail-
way points case study. Reliab Eng Syst Saf 2003; 80:
33–40.
7. Bemment SD, Ebinger E, Goodall RM, et al.
Rethinking rail track switches for fault tolerance and
enhanced performance. Proc IMechE, Part F: J Rail
and Rapid Transit 2017; 231: 1048–1065.
8. Blanke M and Schro¨der J. Diagnosis and fault-tolerant
control, vol. 691. Berlin: Springer, 2006.
9. Ursani Z, Mei TX and Whiteing A. A fault tolerance
approach for railway scheduling and train control.
Transport Res B Meth 2013; 56: 161–173.
10. Hecht H. Systems reliability and failure prevention.
Norwood, MA: Artech House, 2004.
11. Isermann R. Fault-diagnosis systems: an introduction
from fault detection to fault tolerance. Berlin: Springer,
2006.
12. Cribbens AH. Solid-state interlocking (SSI): an inte-
grated electronic signalling system for mainline railways.
IEEE Proc Electr Power Appl B 1987; 134: 148–158.
13. Bemment SD, Dixon R, Goodall RM, et al.
Redundantly engineered track switching for enhanced
railway nodal capacity. In Proceedings of the 1st IFAC
ACATTA Workshop, Istanbul, Turkey, 9 September
2013.
14. Hadaway HW. IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No. 5 – principles
of power point control and detection (British Practice).
London: The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers,
1950.
15. Genner R. Railway Group Standard GK/RT0062: con-
trol of points. London: Safety & Standards Directorate,
Railtrack PLC, 1997.
16. Bemment S, Dixon R and Goodall RM. Repoint redun-
dantly engineered points for enhanced reliability and
capacity of railway track switching. In Proceedings of
10th World Congress on Railway Research (WCRR),
Sydney, Australia, November 2013.
17. Transportation Research Board. TCRP Report 13: rail
transit capacity. Technical report. Washington, DC:
Transit Cooperative Research Program, The Federal
Transit Administration, 1996.
18. Cope DL and Ellis JB. British railway track, 7th edition,
volume 5: switch and crossing maintenance. Derby, UK:
The Permanent Way Institution, 2002.
19. Office of Road and Rail. ORR (Office of Road and
Rail) Online Data Portal – Total journey count report-
ing, dataportal.orr.gov.uk (2013, accessed 12 October
2013).
20. Network Rail Asset Management. Asset management
data related to logged S&C failures, personal commu-
nication, October 2011.
21. Rama D and Andrews JD. A reliability analysis of rail-
way switches. Proc IMechE, Part F: J Rail and Rapid
Transit 2013; 227: 344–363.
22. Scholz FW. Maximum likelihood estimation. Wiley
Online Library: John Wiley & Sons, 2004.
1424 Proc IMechE Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit 232(5)
